

Moroccan Migration and Mercantile Money

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Through a study of out-migration in two areas of Morocco, the author examines the heterogeneity of the mercantile economy. The analysis first establishes that the impacts of mercantile activity in the two areas of Morocco are diametrically opposed, and then searches for an historical explanation. This centers attention on the activities of rapacious officials such as Glaoui and other "grand caids" in the late 19th century and during the French Protectorate ending in 1956. The quantitative analysis strongly supports the contention that dependency or world systems arguments underplay the significance of local historical dynamics.

Key words: migration, Morocco, history, world-system, commerce

A CLEAR PATTERN of migration is a decisive human statement that often requires a response at the level of national policies. Policy is quickly formulated by the nations at the receiving end of an international migratory stream, but the appropriate response is less clear in those areas from which the migrants leave. Muslim societies quite often facilitate religious pilgrimage (Eickelman and Piscatori 1990b), but generally have less explicit national policies toward out-migration for purely economic reasons. The statement made by migration, however, reveals substantially more than is typically taken into consideration in policy calculations of costs and benefits. The orientation toward simple cost-benefit analysis, and away from the structural insights derivable from the migration statement, owes a great deal to the neoclassical paradigm that accepts the *status quo* as an assumption. Historical-structural paradigms, by contrast, suggest that policy might often be more usefully employed in addressing problems and questions highlighted by migratory patterns than in simply assessing the immediate pros and cons of such migration.

This paper uses a quantitative analysis of Moroccan economic migration in the 1960s and 1970s to suggest both that patterns of migration in Morocco are extremely useful in delineating major differences between regions of Morocco, and to suggest that the heterogeneity of the migratory pattern has, in a way that is probably quite typical, discernable roots in 19th and 20th century national and international history. While migration from Morocco to France reflects a general dependency relationship, the reality is that some areas in Morocco consistently produce more migrants than others. Perhaps equally significant, the internal structural causes for migration appear to differ substantially as well.

As Böhning (1983) has pointed out, the traditional typology

of temporary versus permanent migration is problematic since many permanent migrants return to their countries of origin and many temporary migrants end up staying permanently in their new countries. Böhning's more persuasive typology distinguishes three basic categories; regular (unrestricted or some well understood restrictions such as length of stay or type of work), irregular (major limitations such as on movement or residence, legal ambiguities as well as illegal immigration), and refugee. In these terms, this paper deals with regular migration between Morocco and Western Europe, although the migration data from the 1960s and 1970s used in the paper were not collected under this rubric.

Ritchey (1976) argued that there were three major areas where further research was most likely to contribute to our understanding of migration. The first was the study of social structure as it conditioned opportunities for migrants in the sending and receiving areas. The second was the study of individual status as it affected migration. The third was the study of the values and attitudes of migrants as they affect decisions to migrate. Clearly all areas are still important, but the data examined in this paper fits firmly in the first category, with a focus on the sending areas; the analytical results suggest that this emphasis is well justified. The study of migratory selection (Peterson 1978:555) generally attempts to distinguish migrants from non-migrants according to some set of criteria (e.g., sex, age, education). It assumes that there are basic differences at the individual level between those who migrate and those who do not. This premise of two homogeneously different categories of people has a severe limitation due to its methodologically individualistic focus.¹ A historical-structural approach directs attention instead toward characteristics of the local, regional, and international socio-economic and cultural structures.

Migration policy must, to the extent that it deals with direct responses to levels of migration, evaluate the costs and benefits of migration. Traditional policies, based on neoclassical models, assumed that migration was generally a positive phenomenon in that it increased economic efficiency by reallocating labor in space so as to more perfectly correspond to the distribution of other factors of production such as land and capital. In principle, everyone was expected to benefit. By 1975, the Interna-

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tional Labour Office and other organizations were suggesting that migration might have deleterious impacts on the sending communities, such as turning recipients of remittances into consumers, causing inflation, and decreasing the local availability of labor (Griffin 1976). These allegations seem to reflect European social and political misgivings about migration more than the neoclassical analysis on which they purport to be based. Griffin (1976) and others (Oberai and Singh 1982) make a more persuasive neoclassical case for the net benefits to the sending area from migration. Such analysis is, however, strictly delimited in scope; it makes no attempt to address broader structural implications. That political reality, at the level of international relations and local politics, is generally outside the normal scope of neoclassical analysis renders the analysis incomplete but not invalid.

Nevertheless there is considerable evidence for what Myrdal (1957) labeled "backwash effects," the institutionalized impoverishment of less developed regions by more developed regions through a consistent draining of surplus from the former (Wood 1982:304). To the extent that migration keeps profits in the industrialized world, even those based on cheap third world labor, it clearly at some level does not benefit the sending countries. The reason it may appear to do so from a neoclassical perspective is that migration is compared to no migration, with patterns of investment left the same, rather than to an alternative of no migration with increased local industrialization.

Recently, Snowdon (1990) has suggested that migration may be usefully viewed as collective behavior, in which new collectivities, the migrants, create new behavior and norms. In particular, she suggests that temporary migrants, subject to significant limitations in the host country, form collectivities in which new norms and forms of behavior emerge. Mandel (1990) describes the plight of Turkish *Gastarbeiter* who become "germanlike" (*almancilar*) in their native Turkey but remain Turkish in Germany and so end up constructing a new somewhat amalgamated identity. Bennoune (1975:49) describes the situation of North African workers in France as subject to "merciless exploitation, discrimination and humiliation." While in such circumstances, or even less exploitative ones, migrants may well develop new value systems and modes of behavior, the critical factor from the perspective of this paper is the feedback effect of such developments on the areas of origin. Bennoune (1975:55) cites one Algerian writing to request a job back in Algeria who characterized his employment in France as "fortifying the hand that is oppressing us." For many migrants from the Maghreb, however, the choice to migrate or not undoubtedly was in some sense a choice between exploitation at home or abroad, with the main alternative being unemployment. The Algerian cited above was, in at least this instance, unsuccessful in finding employment back in Algeria.

Structural Causes for Migration

The historical-structural paradigm focuses on causes that differentially impact areas of the world. Structure presupposes differentiation. Rather than tracing variations in migratory patterns to individual decisions or individual characteristics, the paradigm directs attention to historical and structural causality. Together these may be glossed as covering both contingent (non-

structural) and structural causes shaping the particular current pattern of migration. In this sense, even if current migrants share "reasons" for migrating, the paradigm directs our interest toward the causes of those shared reasons, rather than toward the "reasons" themselves as an adequate explanation for migration. Not all people migrate, and unequal numbers of people migrate from different areas. Thus, even if all did so for the same explicit "reasons," it still remains important to explain the pattern.

At the international level, a number of Marxist models have linked migration to explicit international exploitation (Amin 1974) or the subsidization of industrial economies by "domestic economies" in the Third World (Meillassoux 1975). While such general processes are undoubtedly important, they contribute little to an understanding of particular patterns of migration; such general models can account for only a part of the pattern. More important, the urban-industrial centered models, which posit simple dichotomies between core and periphery, ignore the existence of a multitude of perceived centers and peripheries (Eickelman and Piscatori 1990a), from a variety of cultural perspectives, and direct attention away from actual heterogeneity, cultural or economic, toward an assumed homogeneity.

Todaro (1969, 1977) suggests that rural-urban migration could be, in large part, accounted for by economic factors, in particular differences between expected standards of living (involving salaries and costs as well as the probability of employment) in the urban and rural areas. This suggestion, though based on a fairly developed critique of the neoclassical model, focuses on individual decision-making, not on the causes for structural differences in wages. Nevertheless, Todaro's model has been significant in orienting national policies toward decentralization and other means of addressing obvious structural imbalances. Unfortunately, as Oberai (1981:242) suggests, these reorientations of policy have had only limited success because they have not been based on significant understanding of the real causes of migration. Oberai (1977) demonstrates that the main causes of migration were land scarcity, low productivity, and the concentration of ownership in a few hands. This list may serve as an initial proxy for causes that severely constrain opportunities for a portion (often the majority) of the population, though this paper will focus on constraints derived primarily from mercantile structures.

There is no theoretical justification for preferring qualitative forms of historical-structural analysis to more formal methods, but there is, as Wood (1982) points out, a clear preference by those using this paradigm for qualitative over mathematical formulations. The formal model used below, although explicitly in the historical-structural paradigm, thus is not traditional for that paradigm. This small innovation will be shown to have some advantages.

Comparison of Northern Morocco and the Tensift Region

The area of northern Morocco examined in this paper (Figure 1) comprises roughly all administrative *cercles* north and east of Casablanca: the southernmost *cercles* included are Midelt, Khenifra, and Rommani. The study attempts to explain rural out-migration through an analysis of commercial structures, as they reflect economic opportunities found in small to large urban centers. Moroccan economic structures focused traditionally on




FIGURE 1. MOROCCO

urban areas and major politico/religious elites, such as centrally recognized leaders (governors or *caids*) as well as local leaders or the heads of famous religious lodges (*zawiya*) who used their influence for broad political and economic purposes. The Tensift region (see Figure 1), encompassing the plain around the Tensift River north and west of the southern half of the High Atlas, has been dominated economically and politically by Marrakesh. The immediate vicinity of Marrakesh, the Haouz, was the area in which the grand *caids* Al-Glaoui, Al-Mtougui, and Al-Goundafi waged their final struggles for preeminence, in the right to expropriate a surplus from the greater region, during the first decade of the 20th century. The outcome of the struggle, unambiguously in Al-Glaoui's favor from 1912 on, as well as the scope and intensity of the competition would suggest that the major characteristics of the Tensift economy took form in the last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century.

There are, however, indications that in important respects the process of centralization and the consequent weakening of traditional bases of opposition can be traced to the early decades of the 19th century. One of the clearest indications available is the contrast in the fortunes of religious institutions in the Marrakesh area with that of their counterparts further north. The two *zawiyas* of Tamesloht and Boujad, for example, had diametrically opposed relationships with the Moroccan Sultan during the 19th and early 20th centuries. I will assume that they were more typical than not for their regions.

Most of the religious lodges in the Marrakesh plain were founded between 1520 and 1530 in the period during which the Ma'qilian migrations from western Mauritania reached the Marrakesh area (Pascon 1977:305-389). Following the last years of Wattasid² influence in the south, the Saadian occupation of Marrakesh (1520) did not change the relationship between central authority and the religious lodges. The lodge at Tit n'Fitr, originally founded in 1149-50 AD, was abandoned when the Portuguese occupied Azemmour (1513) and a branch under 'Abdallah b.Husain established Tamesloht some miles south west of Marrakesh with the aid of Al-Ghazouani. The latter, a popular *marabout* (a religious leader with recognized spiritual powers—*baraka*), had been put in charge of irrigation works

in the Marrakesh region by the last of the Wattasid Sultans, Abou 'Abdallah Mohammad Al-Bourtouqali, and was continued in this position by Ahmad Al-A'arj, the first Saadian Sultan, because of his ability to elicit labor where others failed.

Most likely in no small part due to Al-Ghazouani's support, the Tamesloht *zawiya* was initially a dramatic success. We know that it was receiving extensive tithes by 1570, had formal recognition in a *dahir* (sultanic decree) of 1632 by Walid b.Zidane, and was given a clear exemption from taxes (*iqta'tamlik*) at least as early as 1714. In 1801 the Tamesloht *zawiya* was at the height of its influence with 2,500 well irrigated hectares, but decline was soon to set in. *Dahirs* from 1820 on do not mention fiscal exemptions, and in 1827 the Tamesloht *zawiya* made its first request for British protection. By 1860 the central government's financial demands were so great that the *zawiya* was debt-ridden. As of 1871, the *marabout's* authority was reduced to that of policing an inconsequential town. In 1893 British Protection was extended and maintained until 1929.

For the more northern *zawiya* of Boujad (Eickelman 1976: 195-202, 239-254; 1985), located east and somewhat south of Casablanca (see Figure 1), the 19th century was not so grim. Founded in the 16th century by Sidi Mohammad Sherqi, the lodge became influential in the latter part of the 17th century after judicious or lucky support for the correct side in the first two "Alaouite Sultans" conflict with the Dila'i *zawiya*. By 1680, Boujad was a prosperous supporter of the status quo. In 1790 the head of the *zawiya* was described as a vast land holder, horseman, marksman, and he was widely sought for advice by women and princes.

The 1840s saw an extension of the *zawiya's* power as it was asked to suggest appointees for the positions of *caid* for the surrounding regions. Far from being in direct conflict with the *caids* or the government (Makhzen) as Tamesloht was, Boujad found itself co-operating with the Sultans and controlling the *caids* during the crucial years (1850-1912). In fact the rise of Moulay Hafid in Marrakesh was easily dealt with by a faction of the *zawiya* under Sidi Al-Hajj Al'Arbi declaring itself for Moulay Hafid while the other faction, that of Sidi Al-Hajj Mohammad, remained in support of Moulay 'Abd Al-'Aziz who had in fact brought about its precedence in 1901. During the next decades, the Mohammad faction was rewarded by the French with control of the regional *caid*-ships while the 'Arbawi faction received control of the *qadi*-ships (judgeships).

These two examples focus attention on the caidal structure and its interaction with the traditional bases for decentralization. The extreme degree of conflict in the south is illustrated by the existence of 20 *caids* in the vicinity of Marrakesh (the Haouz) during the early part of the 19th century, but of only three (Al-Goundafi, Madani Al-Glaoui, and Mtougui) in the first decade of the 20th century, and by the overwhelming dominance of Thami Al-Glaoui after 1912 (Pascon 1977:305-389). Although the arena in which the grand *caids* fought their final battles was the Haouz, their influence was based on mercantile monopolies and large-scale land ownership over a much broader area.

This contrast between the area around Fes (in the north) and that of Marrakesh (in the Tensift) is currently paralleled by the greater urban density in northern Morocco and by the relatively lower rates of urban growth in the Tensift. With the exception of the mining town of Youssoufia and the port of Safi, the cities of the Tensift have grown at considerably less than the national average during the 20th century. Marrakesh and Essaouira, in

particular, have had the lowest national rates of growth among large cities and smaller towns, respectively. Rather than remain at this level of comparison, however, we should like to borrow Duchac and Bentahar's (1971) insight and compare the urban economies in the two regions in the context of their effect on migration.

Data Limitations

The data on migration in Morocco, as well as that appropriate to an explanation of migration, are severely limited. Yet there are reliable data that allow us to examine the relationship between urban economic structure and "temporary" out-migration for two regions (see Figure 1) in the first two decades after independence (1956). Because these areas, a section of northern Morocco and the Tensift area of southern Morocco, have had distinct patterns of development since early in the 19th century, their comparison should give rise to a series of historical questions. Though the focus is constrained by the data to towns and markets, this limitation is not crippling because the Moroccan economy has traditionally been directed from these loci.

The data for northern Morocco come from a six-year study of markets done in the 1960s (Troin 1975) and a survey of migration in mid-1960 (Noin 1970). The data from the Tensift come from an unpublished thesis that deals primarily with the very early 1970s (Pegurier 1974). The data, as the statistics will show, are superlative in both cases, although they are analyzed by the authors in a primarily descriptive fashion. The authors do not attempt to develop a model linking migration to market structures.

Some years ago Duchac and Bentahar (1971) suggested that middle-sized towns were important as a "*pole de fixation de la population*." They argued that, as such, towns were the logical point of departure for any study of rural-urban migration. In my view, this insight should be extended to smaller urban centers as well. The analysis will show, however, that in some cases Duchac and Bentahar are correct, while in others they turn out to be wrong. The data available have no time depth, but nevertheless have historical implications. Following Duchac and Bentahar's lead I will try to delimit a set of structural causes, in full recognition that these will neither provide a complete explanation nor adequately define the migratory process.

The Models and Their Results

I develop an explanation by formulating and testing several hypothetical causes for the rates of out-migration that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s, when the data we have were collected. Basic differences between the two regions should appear in the sorts of hypotheses that are confirmed by regression analysis. My main claim will be that the impact of economic growth has been fundamentally different in the two regions.

The data available, although remarkably reliable, put a number of constraints on the sort of analysis that could be done. We need to have both the levels of temporary out-migration and some quantitative measures of the economic structure of the towns in each region. Due to the prominence of weekly markets (*suq*) in the Moroccan economy, both in terms of the money value of transactions and their role in providing employment, one variable was used to represent the structure of the urban *suqs* and

another was used to measure the permanent urban economy in terms of established shops and services. In the models for both regions, two variables were used to explain a third: the rate of temporary out-migration.

In the north we find confirmation for two hypotheses that incorporate measures of the prosperity of the economy:³

- a) An increase in the average *suq* merchant's earnings will cause a decrease in the rate of temporary out-migration.
- b) The lower the ratio of businessmen to wholesalers, the lower the rate of temporary out-migration will be.

By formulating each of these hypotheses as a variable in the form of a ratio, such as the average *suq* merchant's earnings for each of 35 *communes rurales*, the degree to which these two variables explain temporary out-migration can be calculated. There are two customary measures of this process: how much of the variation in out-migration can be explained, and how well it is explained. The second is usually answered by indicating what the odds are that the mathematical results could have been obtained by chance rather than because the hypotheses were correct and the data accurate.

Both these hypotheses were based on an assumption that wholesalers invest locally and in general add to local economic prosperity. A town with many resident wholesalers would be one that was relatively better off as manifested by a greater local availability of jobs and a higher demand for goods and services; fewer people would feel obliged to migrate elsewhere for jobs. These assumptions were borne out for northern Morocco by the confirmation of the respective hypotheses, but there is no guarantee that they will hold elsewhere.

We have suggested that Tamesloht had a rougher 19th century than Boujad because the Marrakesh area was the arena in which the Makhzen (government) collected most vigorously the funds to pay its foreign debt. The Tensift was also the scene of the most extravagant caidal fortunes in Morocco. The largest *caids* were, among other things, the greatest and most rapacious wholesalers in the country who often collected at gun-point and generally operated through numerous agents.

If exactly comparable data were available for the Tensift, we might be tempted to test an inverse of the two hypotheses, but several compromises had to be made because the data available were not entirely comparable. Pegurier's (1974) thesis on the Tensift provides a proxy for the level of out-migration in the form of the value of money orders sent back by migrants to each of the 18 towns he considered. Another difference was that Pegurier's data gives a proxy for the total value of sales in each urban *suq* in the form of the total taxes collected at the *suq*. Neither of these differences make the two sets of data or the two regression models qualitatively different.

One difference, however, is that it makes more sense with the Tensift data to ask whether proportional (e.g., percentage rather than absolute) changes in the dependent and independent variables would be related. The data for northern Morocco include values for actual sales and actual numbers of migrants. For the Tensift both variables have been replaced by proxies. It might make sense to argue that a specific absolute increase in average revenues led to a specific increase in the number of migrants; such a relationship would show up less clearly in the Tensift data when the number of migrants is replaced by the amount of remittances. It makes more sense in this case to suggest that a percentage change in one might reflect a percentage

change in the other. This modification simply requires that the natural log of the variables be substituted for the variables themselves.

These modifications mean that the actual hypotheses I have tested for the Tensift are:

- 1) A proportional increase in the taxes paid per seller in urban *sugs* will cause a proportional increase in the rate of remittances (as a proxy for rate of temporary out-migration).
- 2) A proportional increase in the ratio of business establishments to wholesalers will cause a proportional decrease in the rate of remittances (as a proxy for rate of temporary out-migration).

The general model takes the form of two variables explaining a third where it is assumed that the variations in the values of the two independent variables in the model are in fact due to the differential impact of historical processes on different rural or urban areas in Morocco. The variables themselves are designed to pull out key characteristics of the economic opportunities confronted by those who decide to migrate or to stay. The general model is depicted in Figure 2.

The two versions of the regression model, the first dealing with northern *cercles* or districts and the second with urban centers in the Tensift, thus take the following formal shape including an intercept term (A), two coefficients (B) for the variables, and an error term:

	Rate	Economic structure	
		<i>Sug</i>	Shop
Northern Morocco:	$OM_i/P_i = A + (B_1) S_i/St_i + (B_2) E_i/W_i$		
		+ an error term	
Tensift:	$\ln(MO_i/P_i) = A + (B_1) \ln(T_i/St_i) + (B_2) \ln(E_i/W_i)$		
		+ an error term	

Where:

- OM_i = Out migration from the i-th region.
- MO_i = The money orders received from Europe in the i-th urban center.
- P_i = The population of the i-th region or urban center.
- T_i = The taxes paid in the *sug* of the i-th urban center.
- S_i = The value of sales in the *sug* of the i-th region.
- St_i = The number of stalls in the *sug* of the i-th region or urban center.
- E_i = The number of non-*sug* business establishments in the i-th region or urban center.
- W_i = The number of wholesalers in the i-th region or urban center.

The results are partially broken down in Table 1,⁴ but the most critical points to note are: a) these results confirm a general form of Duchac and Bentahar's hypothesis that migration is affected by the structure of local urban economies, and b)



FIGURE 2. BASIC MODEL TESTED

TABLE 1 Results of Regressions

	Std. Error	B. Coef.	t-Statistic	Probability
Northern				
S_i/St_i	.01564	-.316	-2.77793	.0090745
E_i/W_i	.0000038	.6441	5.66154	.000002898
Model as a whole:				
F ratio = 24.725 Probability = 6.07e-07 $R^2 = .607$				
Tensift				
$\ln(T_i/St_i)$.361	.51753	3.46898	.003435
$\ln(E_i/W_i)$	1.14	-.5777	-3.87258	.001503
Model as a whole:				
F ratio = 15.267 Probability = .000273 $R^2 = .671$				

this structure seems to explain an extraordinary 60% of the variation in migration (the R^2 is above 60% for both models). Perhaps most significantly, the statistical probability that the independent variables as a group do not explain that major portion of the variation in migration is vanishingly small (6.07e-07 and .00027 for the two models).

The statistical results ambiguously support the basic explanation incorporated in the model. Yet the most interesting result of the analysis is its clear confirmation that there are structural differences between the two areas of Morocco examined. In the northern area, increasing wealth in the market (as evidenced by increases in wholesalers among established shops and average sales in weekly *sugs*) leads to a decrease in migration. This pattern would fit a situation in which a significant proportion of the surplus is reinvested locally, providing economic opportunities. In the Tensift region, the opposite occurs. It is as if the wealthier the commercial sector, the more carefully it is monopolized and the more thoroughly its surplus is siphoned off, leaving diminished economic opportunities. The distinctively low rates of urban growth in this region fit such an interpretation well. In fact Pegurier, whose data have been used for the Tensift, failed to find an explanation for the migration because he did not use comparative data from outside his region and because he thought urban amenities and development should stabilize population growth but found that they did not.

Tables 2 and 3 provide the basic data analyzed in Table 1 as well as a ranking of cases for each model according to rate of migration.⁵ A few observations on some of the cases seem in order. In Table 3, it is worth noting that the town in the Tensift with the least out-migration (0), as evidenced by money orders sent to it, is Sidi Ahmad, which is a phosphate mining town. That is to say it is in effect a dormitory town for people working in the phosphate mines and thus a place from which people send money to their families but to which no one sends money.

The second ranked town, in terms of least migration, is Tamesloht, a defunct *zawiya* with few remaining resources and an exceedingly low level of government services. As out-migration goes up for the Tensift so, apparently do both commercial assets and government equipment. The most over-equipped town per person in the Tensift, is Essaouira, which also has the lowest rate of urban growth; it ranks 11th from the bottom or eighth in terms of out-migration. It lacks a weekly market, and so perhaps the lack of this source of extraction explains why it does

TABLE 2 Cercles

Cercle	Migration (rural)	Population (non-urban)	Rate	Rank	S_i	M_i	E_i	W_i
1. Oujda	550	113,490	.00485	18	2092	3040	5485	425
2. Berkane	3500	157,486	.02223	29	1560	2770	1605	132
3. Taourirt	950	78,084	.01217	25	1335	2405	1150	65
4. Segangane	6500	110,760	.05871	34	1269	3445	1615	70
5. Zaio (Leuta)	3350	81,690	.04001	33	825	3420	333	0.2
6. Midar (Rif)	11300	137,533	.08216	35	1292	3405	1585	0.2
7. Guercif	700	86,185	.00812	23	1287	1895	405	20
8. Aknoul	1500	53,530	.02802	30	645	1410	75	0.2
9. Taineste	1250	92,284	.01356	26	1312	2835	118	0.2
10. Taza	1200	115,511	.00764	21	2101	3630	1383	120
11. Tahala	0	66,568	.00000	1	795	1625	113	0.2
12. Boulemane	200	56,895	.00352	17	1285	2160	130	0.2
13. Midelt	100	77,558	.00129	7	1530	2955	990	55
14. Ajdir	3400	99,450	.03419	32	899	2978	1141	110
15. Khemis bou Ifrah	450	24,237	.01856	28	120	405	120	0.2
16. Tarquist	2000	67,808	.02949	31	505	1593	668	10
17. Taounate	1150	166,350	.00691	20	3495	5545	298	10
18. Karia Ba Mohammed	1050	177,148	.00593	19	3242	6661	280	10
19. Fes	1000	122,130	.00819	24	2635	3633	10205	800
20. Sefrou	50	70,865	.00071	5	875	1958	1068	50
21. Chechaouen	2550	142,447	.01633	27	1077	3027	828	10
22. Tetouan	1950	154,361	.00763	22	1410	3975	2938	140
23. Tanger	350	164,246	.00213	11	725	1393	6205	435
24. Asilah	250	78,078	.00320	16	1840	3600	1650	90
25. Ksar el Kebir	250	81,684	.00306	14	982	2150	1650	80
26. Ouezzane	500	159,321	.00314	15	1985	4638	1518	80
27. Suq el Arba du Rharb	500	224,520	.00223	12	5010	10730	1025	70
28. Sidi Slimane	400	227,446	.00176	9	4125	8975	5270	425
29. Khemisset	300	198,549	.00151	8	5261	10320	2000	125
30. Rommani (Zaer)	0	73,099	.00000	1	2840	5880	220	10
31. Rabat	50	84,843	.00059	4	2885	5390	11830	935
32. Meknes	50	115,719	.00043	3	2282	3465	8795	890
33. El Hajeb	100	78,134	.00128	6	1272	2700	305	40
34. Azrou	150	81,294	.00185	10	2373	3480	1040	120
35. Khenifra	300	118,420	.00253	13	3671	5270	1385	110

not have even higher levels of out-migration. By contrast, in northern Morocco some areas with the least out-migration even cluster around major government and commercial areas (the case for the *cercles* of Rabat, Meknes, Rommani and Sefrou near Fes).

In its most basic form the contrast indicated between the North and the Tensift supports one of Pegurier's (1974) conclusions, that the cities of the Tensift are viewed by those interacting with them primarily in terms of how they facilitate access to the government and the rest of the world. The data we have examined suggest that the critical role of the government in the Tensift is primarily to facilitate egress from an economy that leaves few opportunities open except to the elite. In the north a different pattern of migration occurs that seems to reflect greater levels of local investment such that small urban centers prove to have a stabilizing impact on migration. Thus the direct hypothesis of Duchac and Bentahar is confirmed for the north but negated for the south. A study that combined data from the two areas might have led to the conclusion that small urban centers have little if any discernable influence.⁶ This fundamental heteroge-

neity requires further discussion, lest it be dismissed as either an error (the data in Tables 2 and 3, which can be easily reanalyzed, should suffice to negate this possibility⁷) or as some oddity, rather than being, as I would claim, more the norm than otherwise.

We know that in southern Morocco during the 19th century commercial monopolization under the *grand caids* was actively encouraged, intensified, and deliberately placed in the hands of a small oligarchy. It would be odd if the effects of this policy endured only a few decades. The French⁸ began the policy in 1912, when they took over the administration of the Tensift and relied on the wealthiest of the *caids*, Al-Glaoui, to justify and implement their colonial agricultural policy. The policy continued right up to Moroccan independence in 1956. It would be stranger still if in the few years from 1956 to 1970 over a century's worth of consistent policy could be undone.

In the Haouz (Pascon 1977), colonial agricultural schemes dominated the local labor force, and hence the economy, for the length of the colonial period. From 1920-40, colonization

TABLE 3 Urban Centers

Urban center	MO _i	P _i	Rate	Rank	T _i	St _i	E _i	W _i
1. Amizmiz	659,521	5,377	122.6	15	68,453	711	262	7
2. Imin Tanoute	3,913,812	5,340	732.9	18	43,528	783	390	13
3. Sidi Mokhtar	95,347	4,069	23.4	12	120,560	710	247	4
4. Ait Ourir	557,445	4,034	138.2	16	101,840	1682	184	4
5. Sidi Zouine	9,304	3,874	2.4	4	63,200	600	271	2
6. Tamesloht	10	2,837	.035	2	31,626	510	155	1
7. Mulay Brahim	10	1,763	.057	3	0	0	127	0
8. Essaouira	687,874	30,060	22.9	11	0	0	1499	49
9. Youssoufia	226,362	22,435	10.1	5	207,093	1630	574	5
10. Chemaia	89,394	5,611	15.9	8	89,161	1195	308	5
11. Sidi Ahmad	10	4,287	.023	1	0	0	203	3
12. Sept Gzoula	30,169	2,442	12.4	6	154,093	2217	273	6
13. Jemaa Sahim	145,555	1,685	86.4	14	333,659	1693	233	4
14. El Kelaa	230,983	17,163	13.5	7	294,127	1645	812	29
15. Demnate	1,264,470	7,140	177.1	17	16,149	702	489	14
16. Ben Guerir	151,029	6,941	21.8	10	163,331	1280	307	9
17. Sidi Rahel	70,841	2,708	26.2	13	30,367	685	160	2
18. Sikhour Rehamna	27,373	1,550	17.7	9	66,437	923	108	3

schemes absorbed almost all of the active labor force and brought about largescale employment even of women (for the harvests), although women before 1920 had not engaged in this type of labor. After 1940, growth in the population was paralleled by an increase in unemployment that rose to 50% of the active labor force by 1970.

If the Haouz is exceptional in that it was both the focus of intense caidal activity and a core area for the implementation of French colonial agricultural policy, it nevertheless illustrates a process that was important in varying degrees throughout the Tensift. Referring back to Table 3 and Figure 1, of the ten cities with the lowest rates of temporary out-migration (Ranks 1-10), seven are located in the northern one-third of the Tensift region. The three exceptions (Tamesloht, Mulay Brahim, Sidi Zouine) have at least one pertinent characteristic in common: a calculation of the number of offices and facilities associated with government in each of the 18 towns included in Pegurier's (1974) analysis ranks these three in the category of lowest access to government facilities (on a scale of one to five). I would interpret this finding as indicating that they were and are being ignored by *caids*, colonists, and their current heirs. Tamesloht at any rate was bankrupted long ago and had British protection until 1929; the position of the other two towns is less clear. Conversely, the eight towns with the highest rates of out-migration all are located approximately on the latitude of Marrakesh or further south; Demnate is the most northerly of this group.

That proximity to the area of caidal and colonial florescence should have some influence on rates of temporary out-migration even in 1970, suggests that the general contrast between the north and the Tensift is indeed linked to the changes in economic administration that developed from 1840 to 1920. It might appear that proximity to a major city, Marrakesh, may be critical, but Demnate and Sidi Zouine, ranked 17th and 4th respectively in order of the lowest rate of "temporary" out-migration, do not fit this explanation. Demnate is at least three times as far from Marrakesh as Sidi Zouine, but has far greater levels of out-migration. It is probably not unimportant that Demnate was an

area much disputed by the grand *caids* in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Pascon (1977) provides a number of examples. A Glaoui ancestor named Mohammad, met more than his match in the form of a powerful *caid* of Demnate, but clearly expressed his covetousness. Taieb al-Goundafi (another grand *caid*) received the right to administer Demnate from Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz in 1905. Madani Al-Glaoui closely controlled the Oultana (tribal chief of the Inoultan) of Demnate in his role of M. Hafid's commander-in-chief (1907) while at the same time, Allal Al-Glaoui became the *pacha* of Demnate. Demnate was intimately involved in the process of caidal aggrandizement. The existence and sale to the Germans of Makhzen olive groves in Demnate by Sultan Mulay Hafid (1912) and the development of profitable cotton plantations in Demnate by the Mannesman Brothers (archives in the Archives Nationales document this transaction thoroughly⁹) well before this date verify that Demnate was also an early focus of colonial interest. These observations support the claim that the economy of Morocco in 1970 is still very much conditioned by what many might off-handedly consider minor details of history.

Discussion

The analysis suggests that broad explanations of population movements in terms of dependency, world systems or subsidization of the industrial countries by "domestic economies" are far too general. They attract attention away from critical differences between regions and even between individual towns, which may have cultural, institutional, or market structures that are far from homogeneous. This paper has, within an historical-structural framework, provided an alternative to such assumptions, while focusing on economic migration. Despite the normal qualitative tradition in this paradigm, it should be obvious that this type of analysis can be usefully and persuasively done with

quantitative techniques. It is highly unlikely that the Moroccan case is unusual.

Detailed variation in migration rates between regions, counties, and cities is likely to reflect more than haphazard decisions on the part of migrants. We can tentatively claim that the relationship between out-migration and urban economic structure is a direct function of the differential impact of historical processes such as caudalism and colonialism in Morocco from 1840 onwards. That variations in urban economies significantly explain more than 60% of the variation in rates of "temporary" out-migration in northern Morocco and the Tensift may be important in itself for planners. Yet for social scientists, it means in addition that migration can be used to pinpoint more general differences that call for detailed explication. The varied impact of caudalism and colonialism seem to imply that in order to assess their significance each ought to be examined in both a regional and a local historical context. The varied influence of national and international processes at the local level may be fairly precisely demonstrated, and need not simply be assumed to be homogeneous or irrelevant on the basis of preconceived theories, whether they are based on neoclassical, historical-structural, or other paradigms.

At the level of development policy, the assumption of a homogeneity of response to government policy should be dismissed as thoroughly naive. Rational people will respond quite differently to what from the top may appear as the same policy if in one case it leads to greater opportunities and in another it simply "strengthens the arm that oppresses." The structural imbalances exposed by this analysis clearly have relevance for more than migration policy. Whether one assumes that migration is good or bad in these particular cases, there are economic imbalances, what Myrdal (1957) called "backwash effects," impacting the Tensift that do not seem to have been impacting northern Morocco to the same extent, at least some 20 years ago. Since these impacts can be traced to historical processes of considerable age, it is possible that in this respect no major changes have occurred since that time. More generally, government policy, if its intent is to benefit the populace, might improve significantly by using indices such as the rankings in Tables 2 and 3 as a guide. Unfortunately, in the real world clear indicators of excessive exploitation are also evidence of fortunes made, and it is usually just those fortunes that turn out to guide government policy. There is, however, no justification for development agencies or specialists relying on models that assume an unrealistic degree of homogeneity or, worse, that discourage policy aimed at modifying the status quo.

NOTES

¹ This is a limitation it shares with reflexive anthropology, which focuses on authorship and dialogue between the anthropologist and the informant, as well as with neoclassical economics. Although this paper focuses on historical and structural causality, I maintain neither that it is the only valuable paradigm nor that it is an indubitable way of discovering truth. I have discussed my own Pyrrhonic position elsewhere (Park 1985).

² The Wattasid Regency and Sultanate lasted from 1428–1549. The Saadians ruled from 1511–1659 and were followed by the Alawite dynasty which began in 1631 and has ruled Morocco since 1664. The overlaps reflect different centers, e.g., Marrakesh, Fes, or Meknes, and a lapse before a new dynasty in one place conquers all of Morocco.

³ I have published an initial analysis of the results for a slightly different test of these hypotheses for northern Morocco (Park 1979). The analysis here uses a non-logged form and much more careful derivation of the basic data, which are published only in graph form in Troin (1975). That presentation uses a logged form such that a given graphical increase represents a greater and greater increase in represented values as the graphic symbol (square or circle) grows. Doing so allows the depiction on a map of both small centers and extremely large ones. My initial analysis (1979) used only a rough approximation, while the current one uses a curve derived from known values to approximate the real values much more closely. The accuracy of this method, amply tested with known data, is such that whatever remaining inaccuracies there may be would not significantly affect the regression analysis.

⁴ Due to problems with dividing by zero and taking the natural log of zero, on a few occasions arbitrarily small numbers were substituted. Thus when there were no wholesalers, the figure 0.2 was substituted on the only slightly arbitrary assumption that a normal retailer is about one fifth the size of a wholesaler. Similarly, when in the model for the Tensift, a town had no *suq* and so the zero for *suq* sales and *suq* stalls would require taking the natural log of zero (or of an undefined number if the divisor is considered) in order to calculate the first variable, I have substituted a somewhat arbitrary "1" for the ratio of total sales in Dirhams to *suq* stalls (the natural log of 1, conveniently is zero). This figure was less than one-fortieth of the next smallest figure and so, in several senses, makes a suitable proxy for zero in the regression context.

⁵ Table 2 is based on Troin (1975; Planche 1, 12, 23, and 26) as well as Noin (1971; Renseignements Annexes 8; Données sur les mouvements migratoires saisonniers et temporaires en 1965–66). Table 3 is based on Pegurier (1974; Tables 1, 24, 35, and 38). Population figures come from the national census (Royaume du Maroc 1971a, 1971b) which gives the 1960 figures used for the northern data and the 1970 figures used for the Tensift model. Troin presents economic data collected from 1962 to 1968 (1975:24). The data thus correspond well to migration data from 1965–66. The appropriate census is the 1960 census in this case since decisions to migrate would have been made earlier. The Tensift data reflect the situation in the early 1970s and so I have used the 1970 census for that model.

⁶ This heterogeneity is well documented in Southall's (1979) edited volume, *Small Urban Centers in Rural Development in Africa*.

⁷ Alternative models were tested to check the results. In particular the models were reversed in the sense of taking the log for variables in the model for northern Morocco and the non-logged version of the model for the Tensift. The results, most fundamentally, showed less significant statistics. Both signs of the coefficients stayed as they were for the modified northern Morocco model, but the R^2 dropped to 37% and the t -statistic for the first variable in the model indicated the modified variable was insignificant (probability of 18%). For the modified Tensift model, the R^2 dropped to 14% and the F -statistic and t -statistics indicated no significance for the model, though the sign on the second variable (now with an insignificant t -statistic of 15% probability) changed to negative.

These results confirm the reasoning behind the current form of both models. Most basically, both dependent variables in the current model can be expected to increase or decrease in direct response to increases or decreases in the amount of migration. This is so despite one model having to rely on a proxy in the form of the amount of remittances for the levels of migration. Thus, the opposite signs and implications, for the two independent variables in each model reflect a fundamentally different structural causality.

⁸ The archives of CHEAM in Paris include many unpublished reports documenting the activities of the grand *caids* of southern Morocco during the Protectorate period and before. The most important are Capt. Shoen's two reports on Glaoui (#2685 and #2696), *Petite histoire des Glaoua*, and *Le Pacha de Marrakech* (1940) along with J. Fuchs, L.

Baritou, and Cne. Sauley's reports on Caid Mtougi (#2137, #1292 and #1638).

⁹ These archives are unclassified but comprise the documents of the Séquestres de Guerre and are located on the second floor of the National Archives in Rabat. There is a section on German investments in the Marrakesh region which covers Demnate. The archives include virtually all German commercial documents from the pre-WWI period which the French sequestered in order to call in all debts as part payments for German damages caused to France in WWI. I would like to thank Mohammed Alouane, then Informatiste, for facilitating my work in these archives in 1980.

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